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POLICY
Genomic cloud computing: legal and ethical points to
consider
Edward S Dove*,1, Yann Joly1, Anne-Marie Tassé2, Public Population Project in Genomics and Society (P3G)
International Steering Committee, International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) Ethics and Policy
Committee and Bartha M Knoppers1,2
The biggest challenge in twenty-first century data-intensive genomic science, is developing vast computer infrastructure and
advanced software tools to perform comprehensive analyses of genomic data sets for biomedical research and clinical practice.
Researchers are increasingly turning to cloud computing both as a solution to integrate data from genomics, systems biology and
biomedical data mining and as an approach to analyze data to solve biomedical problems. Although cloud computing provides
several benefits such as lower costs and greater efficiency, it also raises legal and ethical issues. In this article, we discuss three
key ‘points to consider’ (data control; data security, confidentiality and transfer; and accountability) based on a preliminary
review of several publicly available cloud service providers’ Terms of Service. These ‘points to consider’ should be borne in mind
by genomic research organizations when negotiating legal arrangements to store genomic data on a large commercial cloud
service provider’s servers. Diligent genomic cloud computing means leveraging security standards and evaluation processes as a
means to protect data and entails many of the same good practices that researchers should always consider in securing their
local infrastructure.
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INTRODUCTION
The genomic research community is facing a big data challenge. The
cost of sequencing is falling faster than that of storage and bandwidth,
and thanks to advanced technologies for genetic sequencing and
analysis, more data have been generated than ever before. Consider
that the average human whole-genome sequence contains approxi-
mately three billion data points (ie, ‘base pairs’) and generates roughly
100 gigabytes of data, and that the whole genome of a tumor and a
matching normal tissue sample consumes 1 terabyte of uncompressed
data. A project utilizing thousands of genomes (not to mention
phenotypic data and the linking of local data with online public data)
for disease research would quickly generate petabytes of data.
Yet, current sequencers are incapable of generating a single string
of properly organized nucleotides. Instead, they produce shorter,
fragmented and unordered sections. Researchers must rely on
technicians and computers to properly organize them. At the same
time, the current reality is that the amount of genomic data and
associated clinical data needed to procure the statistical power required
to advance biomedical research and clinical practice exceeds the
technical capacity of any single site or server.
For instance, the International Cancer Genome Consortium
(ICGC) and its member project, The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA),
have analyzed and released the data from over 10 000 donors,
generating41.5 petabytes of raw and interpreted data. It is estimated
that when the ICGC project is complete in 2018, it will comprise
450 000 individual genomes with an estimated 10–15 petabytes of
data.1 Although the interpreted results are available for browsing,
mining and downloading at a site-specific data portal (in Toronto),
and the raw sequencing data are archived at two sites (the European
Genome-Phenome Archive (EGA) in the UK and at cgHub in UC
Santa Cruz in the United States), there are many compelling
scientific reasons for researchers to have remote access to the raw
sequencing data. Foremost, pan-cancer analyses can be performed
to identify commonalities and differences among the various
cancer types.
Certain projects have been successfully designed to handle specific
legal and ethical issues surrounding identifiability for large-scale
community projects. For example, Bio-PIN allows a biospecimen
donor to be registered without any identity data, and a distinguishing
biological PIN code (called Bio-PIN) is produced based on that
individual’s unique biological characteristics (eg, nucleotides that are
not part of any genotype) in a way that the resulting PIN code cannot
be linked back to the individual.2 This not only ensures anonymity but
also enables a secure, two-way, individual-controlled, web-based
communication with the research platform, such as a biobank.
Similarly, DataSHIELD enables analysis of pooled (but not shared)
data based on parallel local processing, distributed computing and
advanced asymmetric encryption algorithmic methods.3,4
Yet, the biggest challenge in twenty-first century data-intensive
science is more fundamental: comprehensive analyses of genomic data
sets to advance biomedical research and clinical practice cannot be
done without greater collaboration, a vast computer infrastructure and
advanced software tools. Simply buying more servers for a local
research site is no longer an optimal or even feasible solution to handle
the data deluge. As a result, researchers are increasingly turning to
cloud computing both as a solution to integrate data from genomics,
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systems biology and biomedical data mining and as an approach to
mine and analyze data to solve biomedical problems.5,6
GENOMIC CLOUD COMPUTING
Though an evolving paradigm, genomic cloud computing can be
defined as a scalable service where genetic sequence information is
stored and processed virtually (ie, in the ‘cloud’) usually via
networked, large-scale data centers accessible remotely through
various clients and platforms over the Internet.7 Rather than buying
more servers for the local research site, as was done in the past,
genomic cloud computing allows researchers to use technologies, such
as application programming interfaces (APIs) to launch servers
(Figure 1). Various cloud computing platforms have emerged for
genomic researchers, including Galaxy,8 Bionimbus9 and DNAnexus,10
which allow researchers to perform genomic analyses using only a web
browser. These platforms in turn may run on specific clouds provided
by cloud service providers (CSPs).
Four deployment models of cloud computing have emerged in
recent years. Each carries different technical, legal and ethical
considerations for researchers.11
 Commercial cloud infrastructure (eg, Google and Amazon) is
provisioned for open use by the general public and may be owned,
managed and operated by a business, academic or government
organization or some combination of them. Commercial cloud
infrastructure allow customers to build, manage and scale an
infrastructure based on their needs.
 Community cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
specific community of consumers from organizations that have
shared concerns.
 Hybrid cloud infrastructure comprises two or more distinct cloud
infrastructures (private, community or commercial) that remain
unique entities but are bound together by standardized or proprie-
tary technology that enables data and application portability.
 Private cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
single organization comprising multiple consumers.
In this article, we focus on commercial cloud infrastructures that
typically process data transnationally, have built-in security mechan-
isms and can handle the large-scale data generated by international
genomic research projects. Large commercial CSPs have the advantage
of often already having public genomic data sets on their cloud
infrastructure, which save researchers time and effort in organizing
and paying for the transfer of common data such as reference
genomes.
In addition to these categories, cloud computing can be organized
into different types of service categories:12
 Infrastructure as a Service provides raw computing resources,
including processing power (known as ‘compute’) and storage to
the user. Often this service allows users to install their own
operating systems and applications on the provider’s infrastructure
(ie, an ability to rent the compute space) and mount bespoke
research tools for genomic analysis on the cloud. Examples of
Infrastructure as a Service include Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
(http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/) and Google Compute Engine
(https://cloud.google.com/products/compute-engine/).
 Platform as a Service provides platforms for developing and
launching software applications (eg, Google’s App Engine).
Traditional bioinformatics workflow
Cloud-based bioinformatics (one-stop) workflow
Local data 
storage
Researchers download 
data from repositories
Local data 
computing Researchers then upload  data to repositories for
publishing 
Standard and custom 
pipelines, workflow tools, etc. 
are brought to the data, while 
high performance compute 
servers allow for storage and 
processing of data
Figure 1 Contrast between traditional bioinformatics workflow and new cloud-based workflow. The traditional bioinformatics workflow is characterized by
researchers downloading or uploading genomic and health-related data to local on-site storage (eg, computers) for processing, analysis and obtaining of
results. The results are then uploaded to repositories for publishing. This process is typically slower, redundant and necessitates high IT capital expenditure.
Indeed, the traditional practice of genome analysis requires researchers to spend weeks to months downloading hundreds of terabytes of data from a central
repository before computations can begin. By contrast, the new cloud computing bioinformatics model eliminates the need for researchers to download the
data to their own computers. Instead, it is characterized by a one-stop workflow where the compute (eg, standard and custom pipelines, workflow tools) is
brought to the data. Particularly in Infrastructure as a Service cloud computing, researchers can upload their analytic software into a cloud, run the software,
and download the compiled results in a secure fashion. Platform as a Service and Software as a Service cloud computing can also provide a one-stop
bioinformatics workflow, albeit with less raw computing resources made available to researchers.
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 Software as a Service provides end-user applications, such as
Dropbox or Google Docs.
In this article, we focus on Infrastructure as a Service cloud
computing.
Cloud contracts can be either non-negotiable ‘standard form’
contracts or negotiated contracts tailored to fit the specific require-
ments of the cloud service customer. Typically for scalability reasons,
however, commercial CSPs provide non-negotiable, standard-form
contracts that apply to all types of data. Both types of contracts are
generally called ‘Terms of Service’ and cover terms and conditions,
service level agreements, acceptable use policies and general security
and privacy policies—the latter of which can often be quite lengthy
and complex. Sometimes these additional documents may be folded
into the Terms of Service, other times they are incorporated by
reference.
Genomic cloud computing provides several benefits. First, it is,
relatively speaking, low-cost in terms of allowing access to resources
due to its ‘elasticity’—an on-demand service wherein one pays for
what one needs.8 This shifts the need from purchasing many
information technology resources in-house (ie, capital expenditure)
to ‘renting’ such resources from third parties when needed (ie,
operating expenditure). For genomic researchers, this tends to mean
paying for computing time and transfer. Moreover, large CSPs are able
to buy data transit in bulk to increase network connectivity and
translational bandwidth, reducing internal bandwidth costs and
passing on the savings to their customers. Second, cloud computing
may afford greater data security, as large-scale cloud-based infra-
structure typically have the capacity to invest in and implement state-
of-the-art encryption, firewalls and auditing capabilities. Third,
genomic cloud computing also offers increased data storage capacity
and efficient processing, and ‘scaled up’ genomic analysis through
increased computing power, which can accelerate discovery and
innovation and avoid the ‘researchers’ bottleneck’ where researchers
are forced to size their work to the infrastructure their organization
built. Finally, with efficiency and economies of scale, cloud computing
services are becoming not only a cheaper solution but a much more
environmentally friendly one to build and deploy IT services. Cloud
computing is seen to deliver energy savings through external data
storage and data bundling on powerful mainframe computers, though
the growing demand of cloud infrastructure has drastically increased
the energy consumption of data centers.
However, as recognized by governments and scholars alike, these
benefits do not come without some concerns.12–16 In addition to data
security concerns, reliability can plague even the biggest names in
cloud computing. In 2008, 2011 and 2012, for example, Amazon’s
data centers suffered multiple outages, including once due to heavy
thunderstorms, bringing down a number of popular websites and
services and preventing users from logging in to access their data.17–20
One outage led a technology commentator to remark: ‘The duration
of the outage has surprised many, as Amazon has a lot of backup
computing infrastructure. If Amazon can’t safeguard the cloud, how
can we rely on it?’21 As well, closure of CSPs can cause concern about
data control and migration. In 2013, for example, Nirvanix, a well-
funded and established CSP, suddenly ended its cloud service and gave
its customers only 2 weeks to save and migrate their data.22 Similarly,
in January 2012, to the surprise of many, Google discontinued Google
Health and gave users a year within which to make alternative
arrangements for their data.23
As genomic researchers rely on data contributed by patients and
participants and are bound to abide by laws and ethical guidelines, it is
critical to respect the privacy and autonomy of patients and
participants by proactively assessing the full range of legal and ethical
issues surrounding genomic cloud computing. This risk assessment is
all the more important given that the Terms of Service of CSPs are
generic documents that have not been developed with sensitive health
or genomic data specifically in mind.
In this article, we discuss three key ‘points to consider’ (data
control; data security, confidentiality and transfer; and accountability).
These points to consider should be borne in mind by genomic
research organizations when negotiating legal arrangements to store
genomic data on a large commercial CSP’s servers (see Box 1 for
examples of large CSPs). Interspersed with these points to consider are
recommendations for researchers and their organizations. Depending
on the nature of the data, researchers must determine whether
specialized secure private or hybrid clouds (which large CSPs may
offer) are required to ensure sensitive data (eg, clinical data) remains
within an organization and follows appropriate regulations, or whether
commercial clouds may be used to analyze and distribute publicly
available data,24,25 perhaps subject to approval by a data access
committee that authorizes scientific researchers and other end users.
The points raised in this article are based on a preliminary review of
several publicly available CSP Terms of Service. Critical reviews of
privacy legislation and academic literature on cloud privacy were also
undertaken. As there are other types of CSPs, and this is a quickly
evolving area, other issues can arise in the course of genomic cloud
computing. Genomic researchers are therefore encouraged to seek
ethical and legal advice before concluding agreements with cloud
providers.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
Data control
Cloud computing with commercial CSPs entails the outsourcing (or
off-shoring) of data and services to third party providers. Any genomic
or health-related data that used to be stored locally may thereafter be
stored in the cloud, including in a ‘cloud stack’ format whereby
multiple layers of services are provided by separate CSPs. Attributable
to a multi-tenant environment (ie, where a single instance of software
runs on a server and serves multiple client organizations), and possibly
geographically dispersed data centers, genomic researchers place their
computation and data on machines they cannot directly control. To a
large extent, control over computation and data is thereby relin-
quished. Among the risks associated with cloud computing are
unauthorized access (or reuses for which consent has not been
obtained from researchers, patients or participants), data corruption,
infrastructure failure or unavailability. In case something goes wrong,
it can be difficult to discern who has caused the problem, and, in the
absence of solid evidence, it is nearly impossible for the parties
Box 1 Examples of several large commercial cloud service
providers (CSPs)
Amazon Web Services (http://aws.amazon.com/) and Elastic Compute Cloud
(Amazon EC2) (http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/)
Google Cloud Platform (https://cloud.google.com/)
Microsoft Azure (http://www.azure.microsoft.com/)
IBM Cloud (http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing)
HP Public Cloud (http://www.hpcloud.com/)
Citrix CloudPlatform (https://www.citrix.com/products/cloudplatform/overview.html)
Rackspace Cloud (http://www.rackspace.com/cloud/)
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involved to hold each other responsible for the problem if a dispute
arises.
Data control issues are manifest in several areas of a CSP’s Terms of
Service:
Amendments to terms of service. First, control issues arise in the
ability for many commercial CSPs to amend the Terms of Service,
often without explicit notification to customers. Often included in
CSPs’ imposed standard-form contracts is the possibility for the CSP
to vary terms via unilateral notice. This privilege, which is commonly
seen in IT and online contracts, obliges customers to check the CSP
website for changes to the Terms of Service, even if the CSP does not
mark the changes or indicate the date of last change or review. Some
may provide notice only of ‘material’ changes to the Terms of Service.
Further, CSPs will consider continued use of their cloud service as
deemed acceptance of the new Terms of Service in the absence of any
explicit objection to the amended terms or cessation of use.
Recommendation
 Researchers should ensure proper notification of amendments to Terms
of Service with a reasonable period of time for response and acceptance.
Data preservation and deletion. Second, control issues are encoun-
tered in Terms of Service sections regarding data preservation (what
happens to data when the contractual relationship with the CSP ends)
and deletion (the removal of data from the cloud). Even though
control is potentially problematic, researchers should, to the greatest
extent possible, put themselves in a position to control what data are
moved to the cloud, as well as to control what data remain in
the cloud.
Recommendation
 Researchers should ensure that they can retrieve genomic data and that
a CSP cannot retain it or use it after the contract ends, subject to legal
or regulatory requirements and/or authorization of the researchers.
Regarding preservation, some CSPs will preserve data for a grace
period following the end of the agreement (eg, 30 days). Other CSPs
may stipulate that they will delete the data immediately upon the end
of the agreement, no matter the circumstances, or simply may not
discuss at all what will happen, providing neither a grace period nor an
undertaking to delete the data.
Recommendations
 Researchers should ask for clarification of the CSP’s data preservation
policy regarding how long the grace period lasts (if applicable),
commitments to comprehensively delete the data and any costs that
may be involved.
 Researchers should ensure that data exit and migration strategies are
well-planned before importing data into a cloud.
The Nirvanix experience demonstrates that it is much easier to
import data than to recover it or move it to another CSP. Indeed, a
cloud exit strategy is as valuable as a cloud deployment strategy.
Regarding deletion, researchers should consider what happens to
their genomic data after the relationship with a CSP comes to an end:
what is their exit strategy and end-of-contract transition? Researchers
should also consider whether they can retrieve their data with relative
ease to move it elsewhere. Upon termination of the cloud computing
services, does the CSP ensure that the genomic data will be deleted
comprehensively (ie, including duplicates or backups) from its servers
(and any sub-processors’ servers) upon the researchers’ retrieval of it,
and is there evidence provided of permanent deletion? If this cannot
be ensured, a CSP may be seen to assume responsibility, under data
protection laws of certain jurisdictions, for the security of any non-
deleted personal data. It should be noted that under the proposed
European General Data Protection Regulation, a new right to transmit
personal data in the same format could require CSPs to allow
customers to move their data to competitors offering similar products
or services, though upholding this right if the CSP is located outside
the EU could be challenging.26
Data monitoring. Third, control issues arise in Terms of Service
sections pertaining to data monitoring. Can the CSP monitor hosted
genomic data, and if so, what form should the monitoring take and
what conditions should apply? Even though most commercial CSPs
encrypt data while in transit and at rest, researchers should still verify
that the data are encrypted (and find out how they are encrypted).
Additionally, if it is researchers that encrypt the data, they should
query whether they want the CSP to have access to decryption keys.
Although monitoring of traffic data or bandwidth consumption may
be acceptable, researchers could be concerned with a CSP monitoring
personal data or aggregate genomic data uploaded to the cloud, even if
such monitoring is to ensure compliance with an accepted use policy.
Recommendations
 If possible, researchers should endeavor to have the CSP agree to treat
any genomic or health-related data obtained from monitoring or
support or maintenance activities as subject to confidentiality provisions
or to restrict the purposes for which CSPs can monitor data.
 Researchers should ensure that their own organization has data
encryption capabilities and good management infrastructure for control
over data stored on a cloud.
At the same time, researchers should be aware of their own policies
for giving authorization and access privileges to staff to provide login
details to CSP employees for certain situations (eg, support).
Data security, confidentiality and transfer
On a structural level, there is a contrast between the nature of cloud
computing, built on the idea of ‘locationlessness’ (or at least disparate
localization), and data privacy laws, which are still based on
geographic borders and location-specific data processing systems. As
cloud computing is largely built on the idea of seamless, borderless
sharing and storage of data, it can run into tension with different
national jurisdictions governing citizens’ rights over privacy and
protection of personal data. Indeed, as cloud computing enables
personal (health) data to be transferred across national, regional and/
or provincial borders, where little consensus exists about which
authorities have jurisdiction over the data, cloud clients and providers
will each need to understand and comply with the different rules in
place—to the extent such rules exist. In an environment where data
exchange by researchers is no longer a point-to-point transaction
within one country but instead is characterized by transnational,
dynamic and decentralized flow, the legal distinction between national
and international data use may become less meaningful than in
the past.
At the same time, the global nature of genomic cloud computing
means that it is difficult to know which laws apply, let alone how to
ensure compliance with the applicable laws. For example, while
national regulatory frameworks such as Clinical Laboratory
Genomic cloud computing
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Improvement Amendments27 or the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)28 establish guidelines for clinical
data storage and sharing in the United States, there remains no
international legal standards on the use and storage of clinical data. In
addition, the nascent stage of cloud computing, particularly in the
genomics context, leads to uncertainty about how existing laws,
especially privacy and data protection laws, will be applied. Though
it is now well established that data sets such as genome sequences may
uniquely identify an individual,29 there has not yet been an attempt to
reach community consensus or proposed guidelines on safeguarding
privacy in cloud computing. Indeed, there is currently an absence of
well-defined cloud computing-attuned standards, guidelines or model
contractual agreements to inform the practice of genomic researchers
considering the use of cloud computing as a solution for their project’s
data. This said, researchers probably will be more interested in the
applicable law for the CSP who is providing the services, rather than
where data are stored, as CSPs must comply with and be subject to the
laws of their headquartered jurisdiction.
Data security and confidentiality. One of the greatest concerns about
storing genomic data in the cloud is whether the data are secure.
Researchers may fear that storing data on the cloud will lead to
potential unauthorized access to patient data and liability and
reputation damage that could result from a mandatory breach
notification, such as that stipulated in HIPAA. Even though genomic
data stripped of identifiers (including names, addresses, birthdates and
the like) may not constitute ‘personal health information’ for HIPAA
or other similar health information privacy law purposes, recent
literature suggests that this could well change.30 Consequently,
researchers have reason to seriously consider the security issues of
genomic cloud computing and the role of privacy laws.
Such issues arise in Terms of Service sections addressing data
security and confidentiality, along with CSP privacy policies, and data
location and transfer. Depending on the sensitivity of the data,
researchers may want to establish data access committees that oversee
the terms of access to cloud-stored data. Similarly, US-based research-
ers might want CSPs to hold ‘trusted partner’ status before storing
genomic or clinical data in the cloud, or have them sign a HIPAA
‘business associate agreement’ (BAA). Many commercial CSPs are now
able to provide a BAA, which describes what a CSP can and cannot do
with ‘personal health information’, including a prohibition on further
disclosing the data to another entity other than those permitted or
required by the contract or by law. However, applying such extensive
national requirements would not be conducive to the type of global
data exchange needed for the development of a healthy, productive
genomic research sector. The desire of participants and patients to
encourage beneficial research that could eventually lead to the
development of a cure for serious afflictions should not be neglected
in order to achieve an ‘ideal’ level of privacy protection.
Recommendations
 Researchers should verify the data elements to be stored in the cloud,
including whether the data constitute sensitive personal data or
personal health information. Genomic data should be secured in a
way that protects the privacy of everyone whose data are analyzed.
 Researchers should consider restricting access to cloud-stored genomic
data (individual-level) to bona fide researchers approved by data access
committees.
Often data security and confidentiality questions may be determined
by consulting privacy or data protection laws, as well as internal
organizational policies and funding requirements. Data protection
laws may provide only broad principle-based guidance, requiring
the adoption of safeguards that are commensurate with the
sensitivity of the data—and data protection laws across the globe
frequently treat genomic data as sensitive, thereby requiring strict
safeguards.
Many CSPs offer to make ‘best efforts’ or to take ‘reasonable and
appropriate measures’ to secure data against accidental or unlawful
loss, access or disclosure, but this is distinct from a legal representation
that the service will be uninterrupted or error free or that data will be
fully secure or not otherwise lost or damaged. Indeed, few commercial
CSPs will make this latter type of comprehensive representation.
At the same time, CSPs themselves must be cognizant of strict privacy
and data protection laws in jurisdictions where data may be processed,
especially in Europe. For example, section 9 of Germany’s Federal
Data Protection Act mandates the need for ‘necessary technical and
organizational measures’ to be put in place for a cloud service, and
section 9(a) grants audit rights to cloud customers to examine a CSP’s
‘data protection strategy and their technical facilities.’31 Commercial
CSPs should be in a position to implement security and compliance
features that enable compliance with relevant regulations and inter-
national guidelines, be it HIPAA,28 Good Clinical Practice,32 European
data privacy laws or dbGaP Best Practices Requirements.33
Researchers should carefully examine a CSP’s approach to securing
and protecting data, with an understanding that CSPs may not want to
fully disclose their security practices, lest doing so compromise their
cloud’s security itself. Many commercial CSPs offer security ‘white
papers’ that researchers can consult to review the security controls.
Important questions include: does data security appear to be a
priority? What are the physical, administrative and digital security
measures? Is the CSP willing to show specific documentation (eg,
ISO27001 or ISO27002 policies and procedures)? How well are web-
based applications protected? Are there API access restrictions? Are
there multi-factor authentication, automatic session timeouts and
logging functions for auditability? Will the CSP provide prompt
notification of service interruptions or a potential data compromise?
Are cloud customers indemnified for unscheduled downtime? Does
the CSP make data backups or are researchers solely responsible for
doing so? (Back-ups may be necessary to fulfill the obligations of
confidentiality owed to patients and participants.) Do the CSP’s
security measures accord with the researchers’ own security policies
or practices regarding the secure storage of genomic data? Given the
sensitivity of genomic data, researchers should consider whether a CSP
agrees to report any data losses or security breach incidents within a
short period of time (eg, o24 h).
Recommendations
 Researchers should ensure that CSPs have been independently audited
against comprehensive and internationally recognized and respected
information security standards, such as those promulgated by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and Statement
on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE).
 Researchers should ensure that the third party audit certifications are
current and maintained throughout the duration of the cloud service.
Researchers should consider how cloud computing can impact data
protection and confidentiality, both within the laws of jurisdictions
of a CSP and also within the ethical and legal requirements of the
research organization and/or funders.
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Recommendation
 If a CSP is unwilling to commit to a general obligation to comply with
all applicable data protection and confidentiality laws relating to
genomic data, researchers should alternatively attempt to secure a
confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement or a commitment by the
CSP to be contractually bound to the ethical and legal requirements
applicable to the researchers’ institution.
This said, general commitments to laws may be the best researchers
can hope for at this time, along with strong adherence to security
measures such as data encryption, both when at rest and during transfer.
Data location and transfer. Data location and transfer is a critical
issue for researchers, given its intersections with data protection laws,
ethical guidelines and consent forms that may (or may not) address
data storage and sharing. Researchers should be aware that most
commercial CSPs process, store or temporarily move data to any
country where the CSP or its agents maintain facilities. This is done
for service-related reasons, namely, for security, back-ups, support and
cost efficiency. Intra-cloud data transfer (that is, transfer within the
same CSP) is permissible under most data protection laws, provided
there is compliance with the relevant data export provisions, such as
model contractual clauses or Binding Corporate Rules. However,
many commercial CSPs may not always tell their customers where the
data are going at any given moment. This can cause problems in
regions such as Europe, where data protection laws prohibit the
transfer of data to third countries without an ‘adequate level of
protection’ for the data.
Recommendation
 If there are transfers of personal data from one jurisdiction to another,
researchers should verify that a CSP is in compliance with data export
laws and regulations and that the CSP has adequate oversight mechanisms
to monitor ongoing compliance with these laws and regulations.
At the same time, large commercial CSPs increasingly assure
customers with sensitive data that their data will remain in particular
countries or regional zones of choice, even for remote access. Research-
ers concerned about the location of genomic and health-related data
storage should be mindful of the specific locations where data are stored
on CSP servers, and it may be that researchers want their data stored
only in locations providing an equivalent or greater level of protection
for genomic and health-related data to that where the data originated.
Even when the data are kept in a specifically determined country, special
attention should be paid to provision allowing temporary or emergency
transfer of data to additional undisclosed locations.
Likewise, researchers should be mindful of the long-arm reach of
certain laws, such as the US Patriot Act,34 which allows the US
government to access any data within US territory or within a US-
based company (even when there is a subsidiary or operations outside
the US) without giving notice and without informing the person
concerned of the accessed information. A recent US court case found
that US Internet service providers (eg, Microsoft or Google and other
companies offering cloud services via the Internet) with EU sub-
sidiaries are required to comply with warrants and subpoenas from US
law enforcement agencies relating to data held in the EU.35 Research-
ers should be mindful therefore of CSPs in jurisdictions that permit
wide surveillance and law enforcement access to data; they should look
to structure services, to the extent possible, which can protect data of
patients or participants from access requests by law enforcement
agencies.
Recommendation
 Depending on legal/regulatory requirements and the sensitivity of the
data, to assuage national security law concerns, researchers should
consider requesting CSPs to store data and applications only in
designated regions.
Although not always made public, researchers should attempt to
determine in which jurisdictions the CSP maintains servers and which
agents (ie, sub-contractors) can access their data. They should
investigate as much as possible the trail of data storage and transfer
and the ability to have tools that can verify the locations of data
storage or transfer. It is important that a CSP will transfer personal
and genomic data only in an encrypted manner over secure networks
and that the CSP will continue to be responsible for managing its
agents’ compliance with data security and confidentiality.
Accountability
Finally, researchers should be mindful of what may happen in the
event that something goes wrong. What happens when the cloud fails?
With more services being built on top of cloud computing infra-
structures, a power outage, closure, bankruptcy or breakage/failure can
create a domino effect, effectively taking down large amounts of
Internet services and Internet-based applications. In cases of failure,
what forms of arbitration exist for stakeholders, and what is the
responsibility of CSPs?
Liability. Accountability issues appear in the standard clauses in
contracts addressing liability. Researchers should be mindful of the
breadth of a CSP’s waiver of liability. CSPs who have Terms of Service
governed by laws of US states rather than European countries may
waive all liability for any unauthorized access or use, corruption,
deletion, destruction or loss of any data maintained or transmitted
though its servers, regardless of who is at fault. Thus any damage
caused to a researcher's data, such as losses arising from security
breaches, data breach or loss, denial of service, performance failures,
inaccuracy of the service, and so on, even if attributed to the CSP or its
agents, may excluded from any liability.
Recommendations
 Researchers should determine the chain of responsibility for preserving
the confidentiality and integrity of genomic data.
 Researchers should request full indemnity for liability related to privacy
and security.
Given the potential concerns about misuse or damage to genomic
data, researchers should be aware that direct liability is typically
excluded by CSPs. Researchers should also be aware of the importance
of negotiating for a clause that imposes liability on the CSP for, at a
minimum, wilful or gross negligence with respect to defined types of
breach or loss, such as breach of confidentiality, privacy or data
protection laws, data loss/corruption or breach of regulatory or
security requirements that could give rise to regulatory sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Genomic cloud computing is an emerging technology platform for the
biomedical research community. Many cloud computing issues
remain unsettled. The ‘points to consider’ in this article can provide
a useful starting point for researchers to consider when negotiating
legal arrangements to store genomic data in the cloud. Just as financial
institutions and insurers increasingly use the cloud to manage their
data and services (and hold our information in an encrypted state),
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migrating genomic and other health-related data to the cloud is
part of the evolution of existing technologies and large-scale
genome science. But it comes with its own challenges. All
stakeholders should come to the table and work together toward
common solutions that enable trust. Collaboration between large
biobanks and genomic research consortia on these legal and ethical
issues to present a common position to commercial CSPs will be a
major determinant of success.
In any environment, cloud computing or otherwise, there is no
such thing as zero risk. Dedicating more resources to secure genomic
and health-related data will be critical for researchers harnessing the
cloud. But so too will it be critical to have an open discussion with
CSPs of the risks and benefits of cloud computing—the latter of which
is equally important. Transparent practices will be critical to build
trust among participants (government, organizations and individuals)
for genomic cloud computing. Transparency prevents abuse by
organizations and encourages participants to share their data. The
broad access, computing power and speed of cloud computing impels
organizations responsible for sensitive data to institute and maintain
clearly defined policies on transparency.
We emphasize the need for multi-stakeholder involvement, because
introducing genomics into clinical practice through cloud computing
‘is not only a linear function of computing capacity but it (also)
requires the input from diverse disciplines’.36 CSPs should consider
the specific challenges of genomic and health-related data. Researchers
should consider scrutiny of cloud contracts as only one part of the risk
assessment process of data migration to the cloud. They should also
assess which functions should be migrated to the cloud and how, as
well as which internal controls to develop, how data will be encrypted
and backed up internally, and, after contractual agreement with a CSP,
how monitoring will be conducted. Ultimately, diligent genomic cloud
computing means leveraging security standards and evaluation pro-
cesses as a means to protect data, whether local or remote. More
importantly, diligent cloud computing entails many of the same good
practices that researchers should always consider in securing their local
infrastructure. In itself, there is nothing magical about an outsourced
relationship with a CSP.
At the same time, broader and non-technical questions remain.
Scholars of ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) in genomics may need
to consider whether consent practices should be refined to specifically
address the possibility that genomic and health-related data will be
processed in the cloud and any ensuing ethical and legal implications.
Further research will be needed to uncover the legal and ethical issues
associated with other types of cloud computing. Such research would
be best informed if it is evidence-based and seeks the views of various
stakeholders. This will be critical to better develop cloud computing
policy and ‘best practices’ for the genomics community. That CSPs
and genomic and ELSI researchers consider these issues is not only
evidence of due diligence but a sign of ethical conduct and respect for
patients and participants whose data are being used to advance
biomedical science.
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